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1 Introduction
Innovation in the economy is an important engine of growth and no economy, whatever its com-
plexity and degree of advancement, whether it is based on industry, agriculture, high tech or the
providing of services, can be truly healthy without innovating actors within it. The aim of this
work, done by an applied mathematician working in finance, not by an economist or a lawyer,
isn’t to provide an exhaustive view of the all the mechanisms in France and in Europe that aim
at fostering innovation in the economy and to offer solutions for removing all the roadblocks
that still hinder innovation; indeed such a study would go far beyond the scope of this study.
What I modestly attempted to achieve in this study was firstly to draw a panorama of what is
working and what needs to perfected as far as innovation is concerned in France and Europe,
then secondly to offer some solutions and personal thoughts to boost innovation.
Those solutions will mostly be articulated through the development of business and research
clusters like Finance Innovation or Cap Digital that provide a favorable setting for start-up
companies in a particular sector of activity to be born and prosper as well as through some
European Institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) that, among its other missions,
helps young companies, especially innovating ones, to obtain all the funding they need to secure
their future and to ensure not only the continued existence but a strong expansion of the number
of jobs they represent. Innovation, whatever the field of activity, isn’t the exclusive domain of
start-ups and Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) of course, indeed it could be argued on
the contrary that a majority of the economic innovation is made by either large multinational
companies or the Sate behind large public companies or Universities. Still, it is often in reality
through partnerships between large institutional agents and small young companies, or the sale
of a start-up to a large company, or the funding by a large company of a researcher’s project,
that real innovation is made and our study will aim at demonstrating that fact.
In France, as in all countries, the state of innovation is best described by a National System
of Innovation (NSI) that takes into account the actors of innovation (fundamental and applied
researchers, innovating entrepreneurs, business and research clusters), the structures of innova-
tion (SME’s, multinationals, universities, the Sate, European Institutions, etc.) and the results
of innovation (economic growth, lower unemployment).
Innovation is always based on research in all its forms (fundamental, experimental, applied...)
that lead to the creation of intellectual property. That intellectual property can for example take
the form of patents that are submitted in France to the Institut National de la Propriété Indus-
trielle (INPI) and which are protected by the law for 20 years, the form of patented inventions
(that do not have the same legal status as patents but enjoy equivalent protections) or the form of
a know-how protected by the laws governing trade secrets. Then innovation in the economy could
be defined as exploiting this intellectual property originating from research to produce goods and
services. Actual production is being ensured by public, private or hybrid public/private compa-
nies that can either be the original proprietor of the intellectual property by having funded the
research themselves, or that can have rented that intellectual property through licensing, or that
could have acquired that intellectual property and associated technology by purchasing a small
start-up company for instance : Google bought Youtube, Facebook bought What’s App to give
a few well known examples.
An NSI is constituted of six components : Human Resources, Public Research, Private Re-
search, Relationship between Industry and Science, Innovating Entrepreneurs and General State
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Policy. Each of those components have to be evaluated individually and in relation to one an-
other in order to obtain an overview of the state of innovation in a country. Globally, although
France possesses excellent research and a remarkable dynamism of its actors of innovation, its
NSI is quite poor according to a 2011 report by the European Commission [3] : it ranks eleventh
among the European Union’s 27 members at the time (Croatia joined in 2013) and it is classified
as an "innovation follower" rather than an "innovation leader". France possesses excellent NSI
components which tend unfortunately to fail at interacting with each others and that results in
a lot of red tape that stifles innovation.
2 The Tools of Innovation and Economic Growth
2.1 The Legal Framework of Innovation
2.1.1 Public Research and Innovation Structures
The first important characteristic of research in France that differs from almost all of the other
OECD member states is the key part of the State in its financing. Indeed, the part of the French
Sate is around 50 % of all research and development expenses in France, compared to around only
30 % in Germany and the U.K, according to a 2014 report by the OECD [2]. Moreover, those
research expenses aren’t limited to traditionally regal domains like national defense or nuclear
energy but extends to civilian research and development. The second exclusive characteristic of
French research is the relatively minor role played in public research by the universities them-
selves : they yield the most important role to large public research administrations which are
recognized to be among the best in the world in their respective fields of expertise. Those public
research administrations are for example the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
/ National Center for Scientific Research), the CEA (Centre d’Études Atomiques / Center for
Nuclear Research), the CNES (Centre National d’Études Spatiales / National Center for Space
Research), the INRIA (Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique /
National Institute for Computer Science), the INSERM (Institut National de la Santé et de la
Recherche Médicale / National Institute for Health and Medical Research), the CNET (Centre
National d’Études des Télécommunications / National Center for Information Technology), and
many others so that each major field of public research has its own public administration.
The CNRS for example has over 33,000 people on its payroll and administrates over 1,100
research laboratories (including 40 located abroad). Its annual budget is of 3.3 billion euros
including almost 700 million euros of its own resources which means money that comes from
contracts with private sector counter-parties, public institutions like the ANR (Agence Nationale
de la Recherche / National Agency for Research) or the European Institutions. Between 2007
and 2011, an average of 43,000 peer reviewed publications were produced each year under the
CNRS brand and the CNRS also filled between 600 and 800 patents each year. Those patents are
often licensed to the private industrial sector that can translate excellence in scientific research
into real economic growth. Indeed, the CNRS has a long tradition of establishing joint ventures
(3,000 per year on average) with large French industrial actors, public universities, other public
research administrations or other private research institutions. The CNRS is also very active as
a real economy actor of its own, applying its research and producing economic growth through
the creation, under the CNRS brand, of many start-up companies by member of its staff (more
than 1,100 start-ups created since 1999).
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This importance of the State in French research and innovation has traditionally created a
"vertical" structure where public research administrations were often associated with either large
companies, sometimes partly State owned, of the aeronautics, space, nuclear, transportation,
public utilities or telecommunications sector, or on the other hand with start-up companies born
of a patent filled by a public research administration. Medium sized companies in the middle
were typically excluded of these arrangements, leaving them with only a marginal role to play
in research and innovation in the French economy. Moreover, this vertical structure created a
tendency to concentrate the top decision and policy making at the ministerial level (Defense
Ministry, Transport Ministry, Education Ministry, etc...) which fostered short term political
interference to the detriment of a sound business strategy. Indeed, this vertical structure of
research and innovation in the French economy wasn’t immune to criticism as the 2012 Rapport
de la Mission d’Évaluation Relative au Soutien à l’Économie Numérique et à l’Innovation (Report
of the Committee for the Development of the Economy and Innovation in the Digital Age) [1],
published by the Finance Ministry, underlined. Some of its main conclusions were :
• There is a vertical compartmentalization of research that, to this day, negatively impacts
the training, either initial or during their whole career, of engineers and researchers, thus
limiting the potential for interdisciplinary collaborative work, which is essential for true
innovation to take place.
• Since there is a partial disconnection between the world of research, dominated as we
have seen by public money and thus geared toward reaching the goals of research and
innovation of the public sector, and the world of business and industrial development, the
question of the profitability of the main orientations, decided at the top political level, of
the French research and innovation policies needs to be raised more often. Only a research
and innovation policy that aims at being profitable in the medium to long term has a
chance to foster real economic growth in the country.
• There is to this day too much opacity and too much rigidity in the way research projects
are financed and not enough freedom allowed for researchers, especially those who intent
on creating start-up companies, to make their project evolve. As a matter of fact, financing
is very often tied to a series of rules and criteria established by the State that do not always
take into account the evolution of the economy, consumer habits, social structure or the
environment.
These structural flaws of the traditional research and innovation structure in France are also
compounded with the worsening flaws of the French education and higher learning systems and
the public universities are often in competition with the Grandes Écoles (public or private) which
have much more selective entry exams. Public universities, due to lack of material means and
questionable policy decisions over the last few decades, tend have sometimes difficulties providing
a good level of education to the students, especially at the bachelor level (i.e an education that
will enable students to find a job). While the French education system is good at producing
world-class researchers, engineers and business people, it lags behind in offering young people
proper technical training in the IUT (Institut Universitaire de Technologie / Technical Training
Universities) and through the deliverance of diplomas such as the BTS (Brevet de Technicien
Supérieur / Qualified Technician Certificate) which are essential for innovation to work in the
real economy. As a matter of fact, that cutting edge start-up company created by a CNRS
researcher will need qualified IT technicians, marketing and communication people, etc, to live
and develop itself and that’s very often what is difficult to find in France, despite persistent high
unemployment.
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Despite all those structural flaws in its research and innovation system, France has been trying
since the late 1990’ to correct the past mistakes and bring its NSI closer in terms of efficiency to
those of its OECD peer countries. Many legislative and administrative decisions were taken to
boost the efficiency of French research and innovation and that tendency is accelerating since the
advent of the Euro and the ever closer European integration. Among the top measures taken,
we could underline :
• Incentives to increase technological transfers between the public and private sectors through
a series of legislative measures since 1994.
• Creation since 2004 of business and research clusters on the American "Silicon Valley"
model.
• Creation of a very attractive special tax status for the researchers and employees who come
and establish themselves in France at the invitation of a French company (Code Général
des Impôts (CGI) / Tax Code, art.81.B).
• Creation in 2006 of the ANR and of the AERES (Agence d’Évaluation de le Recherche et
de l’Enseignement Supérieur / National Agency for the Evaluation of Research and Higher
Learning Education) that has since been renamed as the Haut Conseil de l’Évaluation de
le Recherche et de l’Enseignement Supérieur / High Council for the Evaluation of Research
and Higher Learning Education.
• Establishment since 2010 of successive PIA’s (Programmes d’Investissement d’Avenir /
Programs for Future Investments).
• Introduction in 2008 of a new legal status for French public universities that grant them
a higher degree of autonomy. In particular, the universities are opening up to the public
sector with the goal of developing applied research inside new UMR’s (Unité Mixtes de
Recherche / Hybrid Research Units) which are often administrated by the CNRS and
designed to meet the needs of businesses.
2.1.2 Private Research and Innovation Structures
France has developed a lot in recent years its legal structures to support risk capital, like in the
U.K where the same kinds of dispositions can be found. However, unlike in Germany, there are
only in France a limited number of public-private partnership funds specialized in supporting
small and medium enterprises (SME’s) that foster innovating technologies : according to the Rap-
port de la Mission d’Évaluation Relative au Soutien à l’Économie Numérique et à l’Innovation
[1], only three such funds existed in 2012, but more are created continuously.
On the other hand, all the E.U states have created structures, whether through tax policy or
legislative initiatives, to support research and development like Oséo in France, the Technology
Strategy Board, Regional Growth Fund and Research Councils in the U.K, the ZIM (Zentrales
Innovationsprogramm Mittelstand /Central Innovation Program) since 2008 in Germany and the
Vinnova program in Sweden.
In France, a large selection of private research structures can be found and most have been
created with the goal of unleashing the potential of public research and gear it toward innovation
in the real-world economy and the private sector. Among those structures, we can give the
following examples :
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• Private research centers that have been approved by the Higher Learning Education and
Research Ministry and that can therefore receive public money.
• Centres de Coordination de Recherche et de Développement (CCRD’s / Centers for the
Coordination of Research and Economic Development) that have been created inside large
multinational companies with the task of coordinating all research policies, planning re-
search programs, administrating laboratories and of course maximizing all possible tax
advantages for the company by optimizing all research paid for by the company with re-
spect to existing government tax relief programs and research subsidies.
• The status of Jeune Entreprise Innovante (JEI / Young Innovating Enterprise) that can
be awarded by the Finance Ministry to newly born SME’s (even a one person company in
the case of a start-up). Such a tax status confers many advantages to young companies
on the condition that they be eligible to the CIR (Crédit Impôt Recherche / Tax Relief
for Research), about which we will talk more later and which is basically a tax deduction
computed from the amount of money a company spends on its research activities, for at
least 15 % of their functioning costs. Moreover, at least 50 % of their capital must be held
by private individuals, SCR’s (Sociétes de Capital Risque / Risk Capital Firms), FCP’s
(Fonds Communs de Placement / Mutual Investment Funds), SFI’s (Sociétés Financières
d’Innovation / Financial Firms for Innovation), public research establishments or other
JEI’s. If those conditions are met, the JEI enjoys a complete exemption from corporate
tax and social security contributions as well as a partial exoneration of capital gains tax
for investors who will, at a given time horizon, sell their shares in the company.
• The status of Jeune Entreprise Universitaire (JEU / Young Enterprise with Academic
Roots) which was created on the model of the JEI with the same tax relief advantages
but which is specific to companies created by researchers working for a public research and
higher learning institution. The JEU status has been designed to encourage professors,
researchers or even college students to become entrepreneurs and to monetize their research
in order to derive extra income from it and create jobs in the real economy. A JEU has
to be created by someone working in a higher leaning institution, has to have an economic
activity based primarily on its creator’s research and needs to be based on a convention
signed between the higher learning institution and the new entrepreneur.
Despite all this, research expenses toward economic innovation in France remains limited in
comparison with some other E.U states like Germany and the Scandinavian countries. This
situation may not be however the consequence of a lack of dynamism in French research and
development but merely an expression of the fact that the most innovating economic sectors
in France (luxury goods, agribusiness and food processing, tourism, high value added services,
etc..) aren’t traditionally as much in need of scientific and technological research as the dominant
economic sectors in countries like Germany.
2.1.3 Business and Research Clusters ("Pôles de Compétitivité")
The business and research clusters, which are still too few in France compared to their numbers
in the U.K and, especially, the United States are a key factor in the cooperation between the
public and the private sector. Those Pôles de Compétitivité consist of "areas", which can be
physical or not, where private companies, higher learning establishments and research institu-
tions, both public and private, converge and pool resources to create a high degree of synergy
for innovation, technological advancement and economic growth. In their respective fields of
activity, those business and research clusters provide all the means of research as well as sources
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of financing so that new innovating companies can be born and existing businesses can thrive.
In France, examples of such Pôles de Compétitivité can be found in Cap Digital for the IT sector
and Finance Innovation for the financial sector. Their action is determinant in fostering innova-
tion and economic growth in the country.
In France, the business and research clusters have been created since 2004 by the Comité
Interministériel d’Aménagement et de Compétitivité des Territoires (CIACT / Inter-ministerial
Committee for the Development and Competitiveness of the Regions) to support research pro-
grams approved by the State. Tax incentives toward the creation of such structures have been
somewhat lowered since 2010 because their profits are no longer exempt from taxation but they
remain exempted from all local taxes like the contribution économique territoriale (regional tax
to finance economic subsidies). Today, in most economic sectors from nanotechnology to finance,
there are around 71 research and business clusters in France and 6 of them have a truly global
perspective. These encouraging results remain however modest when compared with the business
and research clusters, technological innovation centers and business incubators that can be found
in the United States or, to a lesser extent in the U.K. As a matter of fact, those countries possess
world-class giants like the Silicon Valley in California (6000 companies concentrated on 1.5 square
kilometers and supported by Stanford University with its 15,000 students, including nearly 9000
post-graduates) or the East London Tech City (informally known as "Silicon Roundabout", it
regroups 800 high-tech companies).
2.2 A Flawed System, Comparison with other Developed Countries
Despite all these public and private structures and the high efficiency of some of them which
confers to France a worldwide reputation of excellence in some fields of research and innovation,
and despite a clear amelioration of the competitiveness in the past few decades when it comes to
research and innovation in France, the system remains deeply flawed. Research and innovation
in France remains burdened by many legal and administrative constraints and the Tableau de
Bord de l’Union de l’Innovation (Benchmark of Innovation in the Union) [3] which is published
every year by the European Commission ranks France as 11th among the member countries,
on par with the Netherlands, Belgium and the U.K as an "innovation follower" rather than an
"innovation leader" like Sweden (1st), Denmark (2nd), Finland (3rd) and Germany (4th). This
disappointing position of France in the field of innovation, according to the European Commis-
sion, is however somewhat mitigated by its better results regarding the quality of its researchers
and the number of its peer reviewed publications (7th and 8th, respectively, according to the
same study). France has admittedly increased the performance of its research and innovation
system between 2007 and 2014 but tends to evolve slower than its European partners because,
according to the same study by the European Commission, it was 8 % above E.U average in
2012 but only 6% above E.U average in 2014.
This disappointing situation is confirmed by France’s 14th position among E.U countries in
the ranking of national economies by public-private partnerships. The insufficient amount of
private sector investment in French SME’s as well as the amount of risk capital available in
the economy as a whole is also worrisome but this is an E.U-wide problem because, while the
global amount of innovation in the European economy has been stable over the past decades,
the number of innovating private sector companies, especially SME’s, is decreasing. The stable
level of innovation at an E.U-wide level hides deep inequalities in the situation of individual
countries. Indeed, the recent progresses of some states like Latvia, Bulgaria, Ireland or the U.K
is compensating for the difficulties of others and therefore the E.U as a whole remains behind
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the countries that lead the world for innovation, like the United States, Japan or South Korea.
It has to be noted however that all those comparative studies are only taking into account the
overall quantity of innovation in the economy and do not permit to draw any conclusions on the
quality of the research and innovation structures of a country. Moreover, the profitability of the
research and development investments in France aren’t properly measured either by those studies
and to do so, one would need to use the theory of options and cash flows that those investments
are capable of creating, as detailed in the work of Professor Raimbourg, published as part of
the encyclopedic Ingénierie Financière (Financial Engineering) book of reference published by
Dalloz Action [4].
Another notorious flaw of the French research and innovation system is rooted in the French,
and to some extend European as well, business culture. Indeed there is not enough of a “risk
culture" in Europe : the business projects that get started must come to term otherwise it will
be regarded as a serious, even borderline shameful, failure. The bankruptcy and liquidation laws
in France and Europe in general tend to be very punitive toward investors who didn’t succeed
and therefore, any entrepreneur that starts a company that doesn’t get off the ground is often
considered to be a "loser" in European business culture. That situation tends to diminish the
dynamism of potential entrepreneurs who want to minimize the risks above everything else, even
at the cost of missing business opportunities. This is totally different in the United States where
it is much easier to rebound after a business failure. Excessive and overly complicated rules and
regulations, as well as redundancy and sometimes even incoherence between individual member
countries national regulations produces a lot of red tape that also, compounded with a very high
cost of capital, tends to smother innovating businesses in Europe.
3 The Financing of Innovation in Enterprises
The financing of innovation in French and European enterprises is of three kinds : public financing
by the State, private financing and European financing.
3.1 Public Financing
Public financing of innovation is essentially geared toward research. First of all, this public
financing takes the form of tax reductions or exemptions. The Organismes Publics de Recherche
(OPR / Public Research Institutions) are entitled since the Loi de Programme pour la Recherche
(Research Planning Bill) of April 18th 2006 to a complete exemption of all taxation on any
profits generated by their research activity within the constraints of their public interest mission.
These provisions for the OPR concern primarily :
• The public research administrations like the CNRS and the public higher learning institu-
tions like the public universities (for example, Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne University).
• The legal entities created with the goal of administrating a research project or with the goal
of coordinating the research activities of a network of other research institutions, including
other OPR’s. This is the case for example of the Laboratoires d’Excellence (LabEx /
Laboratory of Excellence) that operate under the aegis of the ANR.
• The research foundations that are recognized by the government as Fondation Reconnue
d’Utilité Publique (Foundation Carrying out a Public Interest Mission) like for example the
Pasteur Institute that is a world leader for medical research.
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Moreover, the enterprises from the private sector are entitled to deduct the donations they make
to the OPR’s from their taxable profits, within the limit of 0.5% of their total revenue figure.
Besides those tax advantages, the traditional "vertical" structure of the French research and
innovation system makes it so the public financing of research and innovation often takes the
form of direct government subsidies or loans, subsidized or not, delivered to public, private or
hybrid entities by a number of government agencies. Among the most important programs and
institutions involved in financing innovation in France, we can cite for their important role :
• Direct subsidies provided, within the constraints of European Law which tends to limit
such practices at the member state level, by the central French government through various
ministries or by local governments at various levels (Municipal, Départemental, Régional,...)
• Subsidies and loans to innovating companies as well as research grants offered by the large
state-owned (or hybrid with a majority of the capital held by the State) companies like
Electricité de France (EDF / French Electric Power Company) or Société Nationale des
Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF / French National Railway Company).
• The Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Énergie (ADEME / Agency for the
Supervision of Energy and Environmental Policy) which provides subsidies and loans to
SME’s and start-up companies that are innovating in the field of energy production and
storage. It’s main goal is to foster in France the development of green and renewable energy
in the context of the energy transition currently taking place in all advanced economies
world-wide and to make that transition profitable so that cleaner energy doesn’t only make
sense from an environmental point of view but from a business point of view as well.
• State subsidies provided to firms that participate in the Conventions Industrielles de For-
mation par la Recherche (CIFRE / Higher Education Through Industrial Research) pro-
gram which consists of a company, from the large mutinational group to the start-up,
providing a grant and one of his or her two research co-directors (the other research direc-
tor has to be a university professor) to a doctoral student whose research is centered on
the company’s activity.
• Oséo, which is legally a private bank specialized in providing loans to innovating SME’s,
but with a délégation de service public (public service mission). It was merged in June 2013
with the Fond Stratégique d’Investissement (FSA / Investment Planning Fund) and other
State financial institutions like the enterprise division of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consigna-
tions (CDC) to create the Banque Publique d’Investissement (BPI France / French Public
Investment Bank). Oséo and the BPI are providing funding to innovating enterprises,
especially young SME’s through loans, loan guaranties and direct investments.
All these state-controlled mechanisms to fund research and innovation in the private sector
mustn’t however hide the fact that it is the universities, public research administrations like the
CNRS and other OPR’s which are the key players in research and innovation in France. A similar
situation exists in the United States, albeit with the major difference that most large universi-
ties, while often receiving some public funding, are essentially private institutions. In the United
States, the law goes much further than in France and in most E.U countries in recognizing the
key role of universities in research and innovation with the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 that confers to
universities the exclusive property of their research results. While French universities and OPR’s
do not usually enjoy such a level of independence from the State, they are still the keystone in
the research networks that link the private sector, the public sector and the risk capital firms in
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order to convert scientific and technological advancement, obtained through research, into real
economic growth and job creation.
Since the creation of the Programmes d’Investissement d’Avenir (PIA / Programs for Future
Investments) by legislative action on March 9th 2010, global State policy about innovation and
research funding in France has been articulated around six major axis with the aim of creating a
coherent research and innovation funding program that covers all aspects of scientific and tech-
nological progress including fundamental research, industrial development, as well as education
and of course job creation and economic growth. Those six major axis are the following :
• Support higher learning and education with the goal of creating world-class research centers.
• Foster the valorization of fundamental research through its applications in the economy
with the goal of increasing and accelerating the transfers of ideas and people between
private and public research and the creation of start-up companies by the researchers.
• Provide financial incentives to the industrial sector so it can help support the development
of innovating start-up’s and SME’s through training, know-how transfers and financial
assistance.
• Support the energy transition and the advent of clean and renewable energy production in
France.
• Support the digital economy and the development of a world-class telecommunication in-
frastructure in France.
• Support medical research and the biotechnology sector.
The drafting and management of the PIA’s is entrusted to the Commissariat Général à
l’Investissement (CGI / National Investment Commission) that coordinates all government pro-
grams in support of research and innovation in France and makes sure that all the concerned
institutions (ANR, BPI, CDC, etc..) are acting in an efficient fashion to maximize the benefit
to the economy and the public in general. The PIA’s also play a key role in coordinating large
scale scientific endeavors that require the pooling of the resources of many business and industry
agents, research institutions as well as the support, both material and financial, of the State.
Those large scale projects typically revolve around cloud computing, big data mining, a smart
electrical grid, renewable energy, etc...
The advent of the PIA’s has had a very strong positive influence on the French NSI and
those programs help make up for other flaws in the French research and innovation system and
helped France overcome many of the deficiencies of its traditional (and archaic) "vertical" system
of research and innovation. The PIA’s allow for an optimum management of private investment
subsidized by public money and a better prioritization of the innovating business projects so that
the State can better allocate its limited resources to the projects that have the best chances to
translate research results into economic growth, the production of innovating products or services
and the creation of jobs. The PIA’s also permit a better coordination between academic and
business agents and facilitates exchanges between those two worlds.
The clear beneficial effects of the PIA’s on the French NSI since the program was initiated
tend however to fade nowadays according to the Cour des Comptes (State Audit Office). Indeed,
according to its December 2nd 2015 report [15], the first PIA (PIA1) which started in 2010
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was faithful to the initial mission and did produce tangible results but the second PIA (PIA2)
was launched in 2014 before the results of PIA1 could fully have come to fruition and before a
proper macro-economic and statistical study of the effects of PIA1 could have been conducted.
Moreover, PIA2 has sometimes been used to finance projects that may not have been relevant as
innovating projects capable of producing economic growth. According to the Cour des Comptes,
up to 20% of the investment spending under PIA2 may have been mismanaged. The current
objective is to correct this course deviation by the advent of a third PIA (PIA3), which would
have a better managed budget and tighter fiscal policy and which would be placed under the
direct authority of the Prime Minister.
Besides considerations about the efficiency of the successive PIA’s, their actual size in terms
of investment by the State is also smaller than it seems and it tends to blur the budget evaluation
of those programs. As a matter of fact the amounts of money really available to fund innovation
in the economy (24 Billion euros for PIA1 and 10 billion euros for PIA2) are smaller than those
announced (35 billion euros for PIA1 and 12 Billion euros for PIA2) because a sizable portion of
the PIA’s (around 9 Billion euros) take the form of non-expendable endowments, meaning that
the public money is invested elsewhere and only the revenues generated by those investments
are available to fund research and innovation. Taking all these facts into consideration, the
adjusted global level of investment that the French government is providing to boost research
and innovation in France has been stable at best since 2010 and it doesn’t seem that the successive
PIA’s have measurably increased that amount. Moreover, despite the clear beneficial effect of
the PIA’s, according to a 2014 report by the OECD [2], France still lags behind other OECD
countries in terms of public expenses for education, including higher education, expressed as a
percentage of GDP ( France ranks 18th among OECD member countries) and in terms of public
expenses for research and development (France ranks 19th among OECD member countries).
3.2 Private Financing
The form that private sector financing of innovation and research will take inside a given company
and the means available to that company of obtaining funding, will depend essentially on its size.
A difference has to be made between the funding of research and development by a company
using its own funds or through investments coming from other private companies, and the risk
capital companies or risk capital funds. With regard to the private funding of innovation, the
French system includes most of the other mechanisms found in other advanced economies but
their level of development and availability, especially regarding the availability of cheap capital
for start-up’s, often lacks behind what can be found in the NSI of world leaders of innovation
like the United States. In the following section, we will explore the major means of private
financing of research and innovation available to businesses in France, starting from the large
listed companies whose shares are publicly traded on a stock exchange down the start-up.
3.2.1 Companies that Have Access to the Stock Market
Companies that are listed on a stock market are usually large corporate entities, which can also
be conglomerates regrouping multiple large companies for tax reasons. They often have sub-
sidiaries purely dedicated to research and development in their field of activity. Some of those
subsidiaries may be based in France, especially those that specialize in fundamental research,
but they are also often located abroad, again with the goal of lowering their taxes, in countries
which have a more favorable patent and intellectual property regime than the French system.
Those patents filled abroad may afterwards be sold or licensed, internally to their parent com-
pany, or to other companies operating in France. This raises the question of the transfer prices
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regarding the localization of profits generated by the selling or licensing of patents, which was
studied by H.Hamaekers in a report for the Inter-American Center of Tax Administration [18].
For its part, France established a new committee, which is tasked with checking the fairness and
lawfulness of those transfer prices. It is called the Mission d’Expertise Juridique et Économique
Internationale (MEJEI / Committee of Experts on International Legal and Economic Matters)
and it was established by decree of the Finance Ministry on March 13th 2013.
Those large companies are the source of most of the research and development expenditures
in the public sector. Indeed, according to a report by BPI France [16], only 96 large companies
represent around 34% of the research and development investment financed by the private sector
in France. For those large companies, research and innovation is usually self financed using their
own cash flows. Even though those large listed companies usually have extensive financial means
at their disposal, the very high rate of the corporate tax (33,1/3 %) in France tends to discourage
investments in research and innovation which are often not regarded as absolutely essential to
the business model of the company or to move those activities abroad where the rate of taxation
may be lower. Indeed, as far as large listed companies are concerned, since they are funding their
own research, considerations about the various regimes of taxation in France are determinant in
their research and innovation strategy. In that regard, the most important points to consider are
the following :
• Tax regime for research toward patents. Research and development costs incurred
towards the creation of a patent or patented invention can be deducted from the taxable
profit of a company, without any ceiling. This covers all the phases of production of the
patent or patented invention, including fundamental research, technological development
and product tests. This constitutes a very important financial advantage in terms of
liquidity for a company as long as it conducts research with the goal of producing patents
and new patented products.
• Tax regime for patents. In France the tax regime for patents is relatively attractive
when compared with other European countries like the U.K with its Patent Box system.
The most important tax advantages in France regarding patents are the following :
– For patents that have been filled or acquired, it is permissible to deduct from the
taxable profit (corporate tax or personal income tax depending on the legal structure
of the company) an amortization equal to one fifth of the value of the patent each
year during five years even though patents are protected by the Institut National de
la Propriété Industrielle (INPI / French Patent Office) for 20 years. This disposition
is designed to increase the cash flow of businesses.
– When a patent or patented invention is sold or licensed, a reduced taxation rate of 15%
is applied on the capital gain of the transaction instead of the usual 33,1/3 % rate,
except if the transaction is taking place between two companies which are related,
for example a transaction between a subsidiary and its parent company. In case the
sale price is lower than the actual value of the patent or patented invention, then
the entirety of the loss can be deducted from the corporate tax or the income tax,
depending on the legal structure of the business.
– When a patent is added to the assets of a company in exchange for shares of its capital,
then the company doesn’t have to pay a registration fee even if the patent has already
been exploited.
– For private individuals, the value of patents isn’t added to the total wealth in the com-
putation of the Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortune (ISF / Solidarity Tax on Wealth).
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Despite this attractive tax regime for patents, the relatively heavy taxation of businesses
in France (corporate tax, social security costs, etc...) has a clear negative impact on
innovation. As a matter of fact, a common tax optimization scheme for a French company
consists in conducting research in France in order to benefit from all the financial programs
designed to lower its costs, then the patent produced by that research is filled abroad in
ad-hoc legal structures based in a tax haven country or territory, finally that same patent
is sold to the original French company which benefits from the tax deduction associated
with the sale of a patent.
• The Crédit Impôt Recherche (CIR / Research Tax Credit). The CIR in France is one of
the most generous tax deduction programs geared toward fostering research and innovation
among all of the OCDE countries according to Daniel Boucher [6]. It is available for all
companies and businesses in France, regardless of their size or legal form, as long as they
have research and development expenses (fundamental research, applied research, experi-
mental development and prototypes, etc...), whatever their field of activity. Since it is, as
we have already seen, the large listed companies which account for most of the research
and development expenses of the private sector in France, it is naturally those same listed
companies that benefit the most from the CIR. The CIR is equivalent to the Research and
Experimentation Tax Credit in the United States and the R&D Tax Credit in the U.K but
it doesn’t have any real equivalent in Germany that relies exclusively on other programs
like the ZIM about which we have talked earlier and which is a very efficient tool to fund
research and innovation in businesses, especially for SME’s.
The CIR consists of a tax credit that concerns the taxable profit (corporate tax or personal
income tax depending on the legal structure of the company). It represents each year one
of the three largest losses of tax revenue for the State. If the tax credit is larger than the
amount of the tax that is due, then the balance is reimbursed by State after at most three
years or even sometimes immediately as, for example, in the case of a Jeune Entreprise
Innovante (JEI). The CIR is equal to 30% of the research expenses up to 100 million euros
and 5% above. Every year, the research expenses of a company are computed by summing
the following items :
– The amortization of patents.
– The salaries of researchers and the corresponding social security contributions.
– A lump sum equal to 75% of the amortization of patents plus 50% of salaries of
researchers and the corresponding social security contributions. This lump sum is
designed to take into account all the other expenses related to the research activity
in the company (rents, transports, computers, equipment, etc...).
– The expenses corresponding to subcontracting research to another company or to a
public institution, with a ceiling of 10 million euros.
– Various other costs associated with research like INPI fees and technology watch.
On top of all these disposition, there is another tax credit called "CIR innovation" (Research
Tax Credit for Innovation) that is reserved to SME’s. It is a tax credit corresponding
to 20% of the expenses incurred towards ameliorating the efficiency of existing products
without the intervention of researchers or the filling of new patents. The ceiling of the CIR
Innovation is 400,000 euros per year.
The CIR program is very expensive for the State. It costs around 5 billion euros per year
in the form of lost tax income and this cost is expected to grow up to 7 billion euros in
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lost tax income in coming years, when the program reaches its cruising speed. According
to the OECD [2], this represents an amount four to six times larger than the combined
government subsidies given to foster research and innovation in the private sector and one
third of the costs incurred toward research and development in the public sector (which
from a legal point of view do not include the CIR). Given its very large cost, the CIR
program has naturally come under review and the question of its efficiency in supporting
research and innovation in the French economy has naturally been posed many times in
the political debate. While the CIR is undeniably an important program with a lot of
potential to foster innovation in the French economy, and some impressive results over the
years, as demonstrated by the work of the Observatoire du CIR [19], it remains somewhat
controversial. Indeed, the Cour des Comptes published a report in September 2013 [7] that
underlines some flaws in the CIR system, and calls its efficiency into question, especially
given its high cost to the State. While also proposing many reforms to improve the efficiency
of the CIR, some of the main conclusions of that report were :
– The efficiency of the CIR regarding its main objective, which is to increase the research
and development investments of the private sector, is difficult to precisely quantify.
Moreover, the increase in those research and development investments doesn’t seem
to reflect the tax advantage offered by the State.
– Managing the CIR is difficult, both for the companies that benefit from it and for the
French tax administration. Much of the red tape could be removed by allowing online
filling of CIR documents.
– The tax administration is unable to properly target its controls and tax audits in
order to uncover companies which are abusing the CIR. A large part of the problem
lies in the opacity and the complexity of the rules governing the CIR.
– The ministry of education and higher learning doesn’t have the resources needed to
assure in good conditions its mission of supervision of the research activities of the
companies that benefit from the CIR.
3.2.2 Companies that Aren’t Listed on the Stock Market
For those companies, which are typically of intermediate size, self funding of research and inno-
vation is usually not an option because they do not possess enough own funds and the necessary
cash flows generated by a high turnover. They aren’t listed on a stock market which means
that they cannot raise capital through the sale of shares on the stock market which remains the
most efficient method of equity financing. They will encounter difficulties obtaining loans and
guarantees to finance research and innovation from the banking sector as well because, especially
in the current financial crisis climate, innovating SME’s represent a very high risk for the banks.
Because of the stringent banking regulations, at the French, European and international level
with the Basel III recommendations, banks will find themselves in no position to offer loans
to risky SME’s. This fact is one of the main conclusions of a 2013 report by the European
Commission [8]. Those financial and banking rules and regulations clearly serve an important
purpose in defending the global financial and banking system against systemic events similar to
those created by the Lehman Brothers collapse of 2008, which was precipitated by the Sub-prime
Crisis taking its roots in the U.S real-estate sector where banks and other financial institutions
took the unfortunate habit of offering a very large number of bad and extremely risky loans to
struggling people who had little chance of ever repaying them. However, effectively forbidding
banks to offer risky loans stifles innovation in the economy as well. Leverage ratios and own funds
requirements of Basel III in particular tend to have the pernicious effect of starving innovating
14
SME’s of the much needed capital they need to develop their activity and/or of rendering access
to capital too expensive for them, because the cost for the banks of providing that capital has
become to high. A middle ground has to be found in the future between security and avoiding
smothering innovation in the economy because while all those new banking regulations might
help prevent another Lehman Brothers, they might also unfortunately kill in the egg the next
Google or Facebook.
To remedy this situation, France has created many legal and financial structures designed
to provide much needed capital to innovating companies of intermediate size so that they can
develop their activity. Those many private equity initiatives and venture capital trusts are
sometimes more efficient that stock markets in providing capital to innovating SME’s created
by dynamic entrepreneurs, according to R.S Harris, T. Jenkinson and S.N Kaplan [9]. Among
those structures, the most notable are :
1. The Fonds Communs de Placement pour l’Innovation (FCPI / Mutual Investment
Funds for Innovation). Those structures are collective investment funds that are neither
companies nor trusts from a legal point of view. They are basically just an "account" that
is being managed by a bank or another financial institution and they are a particular kind
of Fond Commun de Placement (FCP). The structure of an FCP and the steps toward its
creation are always the same, be it designed for innovation in the economy or not :
• First, a banking establishment creates an account (the FCP) which is designed to
receive deposits from both private investors and businesses. The legal form of the
FCP specifies the ways the bank will have to manage it. For example, the bank will
have to invest the deposits into a given sector of activity (innovating companies for
the FCPI), or into the economy of a given country or territory, or into a given kind
of businesses, etc..
• Investors then place their money in the FCP and receive in exchange shares of the
FCP, which are expected to increase in value with time and which may be sold later
on, generating a capital gain.
At least 70% of the assets of an FCPI must be invested in the capital of unlisted companies
of less than 500 employees and which are considered as being "innovative" according to the
following criteria :
• They must have research expenses eligible for the CIR representing at least one third
of their total revenue.
• They have to be able to provide evidence for the creation of innovating products,
techniques or services.
• At least 70% of their capital must be held by private individuals, or a public research
establishment, or other innovating companies of the same kind, according to the same
criteria that we have just detailed.
In order to support the development of the FCPI’s, a special tax reduction system has been
put in place for private individuals who invest in them by purchasing shares. The main
provisions of this tax reduction program are the following :
• There is first of all a tax credit (informally called "réduction Madelin" in the name of
a former French finance minister of the mid-1990’s, Code Général des Impôts (CGI)
/Tax Code, art.199 terdecies-0A), that is of the same nature as the British Enterprise
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Investment Scheme (EIS), and which is equal to 18 % of the yearly investment into
FCPI shares, with a ceiling of 50,000 euros per year for a single person and 100,000
euros per year for a married couple, under the condition that the shares be kept for
at least five years.
• Then there is a tax advantage known as "non-imposition immédiate" (delayed taxation)
which consists of adding the revenues and capital gains generated by the FCPI shares
to the value of those shares (which may be sold at a later date) without immediate
taxation by way of the personal income tax.
• Finally, if the shares are kept for at least five years, there is a complete exemption
of the personal income tax corresponding to capital gain generated by the sale or
acquisition of those shares.
Moreover, these FCPI structures allow investors to benefit from the experience of pro-
fessionals specialized in funding research and innovation in the economy and in handling
innovating companies as well as the inherent risks associated with them. F. Moulin and D.
Schmidt detail in their book "Les Fonds de Capital Investissement, Principes Juridiques
et Fiscaux" [10] how investing in FCPI’s permits to benefit from people with knowledge of
the innovating SME’s business ecosystem, to achieve economies of scale and to pool the
risks.
Despite the many tax advantages, the FCPI structure seems however to be losing its at-
tractiveness among investors. Indeed, there were around 97,000 owners of FCPI shares in
France in 2014, down from 145,000 in 2008 and the total amount invested in FCPI’s has
dropped by 32% during the same period according to A. Vion in Les Echos newspaper of
April 16th 2015 [11].
2. Other private equity structures. Besides the FCPI’s, many other structures, which
may differ among one another with regards to their size, scope and target companies, exist
in France to finance the research and innovation of the SME’s. They all revolve around
private equity and can take various legal forms. All these legal structures benefit from a
tax exemption on their profits (exemption of the corporate tax or of the personal income
tax depending on their legal form).
• The Fonds Communs de Placement à Risque (FCPR / Mutual Fund for Risky
Investment) Those funds have essentially the same legal form as FCPI’s but they are
specialized in "risky investments", which in particular can be investments in innovating
companies.
• The Sociétés de Capital Risque (SCR / Risk Capital Firm) Those firms are fi-
nancial companies specialized in asset and portfolio management. Their mission is
to help the launch of new companies which are active in research and innovation by
investing at least 50 % of their assets in the capital of unlisted innovating SME’s or
in the capital of innovating companies with a small capitalization and limited access
to the stock market.
• The Sociétés Unipersonnelles d’Investissement à Risque (SUIR / One Person
Company Dealing with Risky Investment) Those financial firms are similar in struc-
ture to the SCR’s but they consist of only one shareholder who has to be a private
individual.
• The Sociétés Financières d’Innovation (SFI / Financial Firm for Innovation)
Those firms, which have to be registered with the Finance Ministry and are subjected
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to government oversight, support research, innovation and technological advancement
in the economy by funding the development of SME’s involved in the elaboration of
new products and services. They must invest at least one third of their assets in
innovating projects. Their investment can take the form of a direct acquisition of
shares of the capital of innovating SME’s or they can provide to them intellectual
property assets like patents relevant to their innovation.
Moreover, besides the "réduction Madelin" that we mentioned earlier, there is also for pri-
vate individuals a reduction of the Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortune (ISF / Solidarity Tax on
Wealth) equal to 50 % (CGI, art. 885-0 bis) of the investment in shares of the capital of SME’s
from an E.U country (not only innovating SME’s) that operates in the industrial, commercial,
arts and crafts, agribusiness or service sectors, but not in the financial sector. The ceiling for
the ISF reduction is of 45,000 euros per year and this tax deduction cannot be cumulated with
the "réduction Madelin" on the personal income tax.
Despite all these programs and structures designed to boost private investment into inno-
vating SME’s, the French system is still far behind the American system in terms of efficiency
and dynamism. Indeed, France doesn’t have in its legal system something as versatile as the
status of Small Business Investment Company (SBIC). SBIC’s are basically private businesses
specialized in investing in SME’s and which can use their own funds as well as loans that have
been guaranteed by the federal SBA (Small Business Administration). In the American busi-
ness landscape, one can also find the New Market Venture Capital Companies (NMVCC) which
specialize in investing in the capital of SME’s located in economically underprivileged regions
of the U.S, and which also support research and innovation. In the U.K, there used to be the
Capital for Enterprise Limited (CfEL) until it was merged in October 2013 with the Depart-
ment for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) to be part of the British Business Bank program.
It continues under this new form its mission of providing financial assistance to British SME’s
and start-up companies and the program is considered to be close to being as successful as its
American counterparts. In France, progress still needs to be made and the Finance Ministry
underlined in its Report of the Committee for the Development of the Economy and Innovation
in the Digital Age [1] that :
• When it comes to funding research and innovation in the economy, there is still in France an
insufficient role played by the "business angels" and venture capital (France is even below
the average of the European Union for the availability of venture capital expressed as a
percentage of GDP) and that situation persists despite the creation of the Fond National
d’Amorçage (FNA / National Fund for Start-up Companies) which represents only around
100 million euros of investment per year. This may have to do with legal restrictions (for
example the obligation in some cases to sell the start-up to a European company) that may
apply when the entrepreneur attempts to sell a successful start-up that benefited in one
way or another from public funding. Indeed it is often the business strategy of start-up
company creators to intend from the beginning to sell the company later on to an industry
leader (to give a few very famous examples: Facebook bought What’s App, Google bought
Youtube, etc...) and this sale is often the only real compensation the original entrepreneurs
gets for their work because in the growth phase, they often get no salary from the fledgling
company they created.
• The availability of risk capital is still insufficient in the "middle stage" of the life-cycle of a
typical start-up company. That is the investment that is supposed to take over the funding
of the start-up after an initial phase of funding, led by the original investors themselves
and their families.
17
• Technical and legal hurdles need to be overcome to permit successful start-up companies at
a later development stage to access the stock market more easily, thus raising the prospect
of raising more capital or being acquired by a larger firm in France.
3.2.3 The Case of the Start-up Companies
Start-up companies are usually very small companies (Très Petites Entreprises (TPE)) which
are born around "key-persons" (sometimes a single entrepreneur) who usually plan to exploit the
economic potential of their own research, patents or patented inventions. The typical economic
and financial strategy behind the setup of a start-up company based on original scientific research
is the following:
• Researchers or inventors provide their patents, patented inventions or know-how to the
newly created company that starts to develop around those "key persons". There is some-
thing like a bet in a project like this : if the company succeeds and grows, then the key
persons will get rich by selling their shares of the capital later on, but if the company fails
the loss will be theirs and they will get nothing.
• The compensation of the key persons usually doesn’t take the form of a salary which is
much too expensive from the point of view of a small company because of all the taxes and
social security contributions associated, and not attractive enough from the point of view
of the entrepreneur. This compensation will, hopefully, take the form of the capital gain
generated from the sale by the key persons of their participation in the company (their
shares of the capital). Once the key persons have severed their link with the company they
created, they sometimes start over and create another company and attempt to be, in the
jargon of the start-up creators community, "serial winners".
In order to facilitate start-up creation, which is associated with innovation and dynamism in the
economy, France created a series of legal protections, financial structures and instruments as well
as a special legal status for start-up creators, much like the United States with the Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP). The key points of the French system regarding start-up creation
are the following :
1. Upon entry of the inventor/entrepreneur into the new start-up (or into an existing start-up
that wishes to develop a new product using his or her research), he or she brings a patent,
patented invention or know-how and may receive in exchange several kinds of financial
instruments like :
• The Obligations Convertibles en Actions (OCA / bonds convertible into shares) or
the Obligations Échangeables en Actions (OAE / bonds exchangeable for shares).
The precise workings of those financial instruments are explained in details in the
work of Jean-Claude Augros [12] and of Philippe Raimbourg [5], but the basic idea is
for the inventor to enter the company as a mere lender and to exit as a shareholder.
• The Bons de Souscription de Parts de Créateur d’Entreprise (BSPCE / share warrants
for entrepreneurs) which enable the future creation of new shares earmarked for the
key persons of the start-up company.
• The Attributions Gratuites d’Actions (AGA / attribution of free shares) that are
reserved for the key persons upon creation of the start-up company. Their precise
workings are detailed in the work of P. de Fréminet [13].
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• The stock-options (SO) that are designed to provide compensation for the key persons
by giving them the right, upon creation of the start-up, to buy shares of the company
in the future at a given strike price (call option). Assuming the value of the shares
will increase over the years, the SO allows the key persons to realize a future capital
gain. Obviously, the risk lies in a depreciation or stagnation of the value of the shares.
All these dispositions therefore permit to compensate an inventor/entrepreneur, not with a
salary but with a future capital gain on the sale of shares, when he or she eventually leaves
the start-up. This capital gain corresponds to the added value the inventor/entrepreneur
provided to the start-up through his or her research, innovation and management skills. It
has to be noted that this compensation arrangement has been for a few years less and less
profitable because it is based on the difference between the taxation levels of capital gains
and salaries. Indeed, salaries tend to be more expensive from a tax optimization point of
view and they also include social security contributions. However, this difference between
the levels of taxation of capital gains and salaries are currently being called into question
and many of the tax advantages of the usual compensation system of start-up creators are
in the process of being adjusted downwards, as the levels of taxation of capital gain and
salaries converge in many cases. This analysis is detailed in the work of A.Guillemonat,
O.Ramond who published an in depth review of current management packages in the 10th
issue of the Revue de Droit Fiscal in 2015 [14].
2. Upon exit of the inventor/entrepreneur from the start-up company, the sale of his or her
shares generates a capital gain. This capital gain is admittedly subject to taxation under
the same terms as dividends from equity (progressive rate of 0% to 45%, plus social security
contributions), except for BSPCE which are taxed at a flat rate of 19% plus social security
contributions, however a tax deduction is offered depending on the duration the shares were
kept by the inventor/entrepreneur. This tax reduction can climb up to 85% for shares of an
SME which have been acquired within ten years of the creation of the company. Moreover,
upon exiting the start-up and selling his or her shares, the inventor/entrepreneur may claim
further tax reductions under French law by invoking the taxation regime that is reserved
to the "revenus exceptionnels" (exceptional revenue). Today, in order to benefit from those
dispositions, the key persons aren’t required to have top management responsibilities inside
the star-up or to be officially heading the company, as it was mandatory in the past.
Many other structures, which may be public, private or hybrid support the creation of start-
up companies, in every field of activity, in France and the innovation and dynamism they bring
into the economy. To cite only a few, we can talk about :
• The important role played by the pôles de compétitivité and the pôles d’innovation (business
and research clusters) as we have already seen in the part about the tools of innovation and
economic growth. Those business and research clusters provide funding to the fledgling
companies but their action isn’t limited to that and they do as well offer legal advice,
practical and technical advice and support for the entrepreneurs or would-be entrepreneurs
who have the project of exploiting their innovating ideas by creating a start-up. In France,
Cap Digital fulfills this mission in the information technology sector and Finance Innovation
fulfills this mission for start-up companies in the financial sector, especially supporting
the newly born companies through its program of "projets labélisés" (approved projects)
which gives financial start-up’s the recognition and visibility they need to thrive in a very
competitive business landscape.
• The emerging role played by the "crowd funding" companies and online platforms. As a
matter of fact, despite the many funding opportunities that we have seen, sometimes an
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entrepreneur cannot have access to private equity, government subsidies or loans and can
only count on his own funds to start a company. This is where the crowd funding solutions
available in France may play a determinant role. These crowd funding solutions (Anaxago,
Wiseed, Finance Utile, etc.) serve as intermediaries between "micro-investors" and the
would be founder of a TPE. They are like the middle ground between a proper investment
fund and family investment. They have also the advantage of relying on professionals
with knowledge of the TPE ecosystem, like the Conseillers en Investissement Participatif
(crowd funding advisors), which is a label recognized by the Finance Ministry, who can vet
the projects and provide valuable advice to both the investors and the entrepreneurs.
3.3 European Financing
3.3.1 European Programs
The funding of the European research and innovation policy has been since 1984 articulated
around the Programmes Cadres de Recherche et Développement Technologique (PCRDT /
Framework Program of Research and Technological Development), but the European research
policy only reached its true potential with the creation in January 2000 of the Espace Européen de
la Recherche (EER / European Rsearch Area) by the European Commission under the initiative
of Philippe Busquin, who was then the European Commissioner for research and who authored
several reports underlining the deep flaws in the European research system and its inability to
transform scientific research into economic growth. Over the years, the greater role taken by
the European Investment Bank (EIB) in funding research and innovation also accounts for the
much more efficient nature of the research and innovation system in the European economy today.
The 8th PCRDT named "Programme Cadre pour la Recherche et l’Innovation" (Framework
Program for Research and Innovation) is part of the Europe 2020 program, which is a 10-year
strategy proposed by the European Commission on March 3rd 2010, and it covers the period
2014-2020. According to an official report authored by José Manuel Barroso for the European
Commission [17], the goals of the program are to maximize research and innovation funded by
the European Union, to foster economic growth that is sustainable, inclusive and employment-
generating and to face the great challenges in the European society and economy. Toward those
goals, the program must create a coherent series of structures and institutions spanning the entire
research and innovation ecosystem from fundamental research to the introduction on the market
of new innovating products and services.
The objectives and the budget of each PCRDT are set by the Conseil Européen de la
Recherche (ERC / European Research Council) under the direct supervision of the European
Commission, which calls upon independent experts for the selection phase and the evaluation
of projects, which are chosen after a public invitation to tender and are published afterwards in
the Official Journal of the European Union. The 7th PCRDT lasted seven years had a budget of
50.5 billion euros, to which should be added 2,7 euros for the legally separate, but structurally
integrated, Euratom project on nuclear research between 2007 and 2012. The 8th PCRDT is
envisioned to have a budget of 80 billion euros until 2020, including estimations of 25 billion
euros for cutting edge scientific projects, 18 billion euros for industrial innovation which includes
nanotechnology, nanoelectronics, etc., and 32 billion euros for major challenges in European So-
ciety which include public health, agriculture, clean energy and the energy transition, marine
research, etc.
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3.3.2 The European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank (EIB) has been established in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome. It
is a non-profit international financial institution whose shareholders are the E.U member states.
It functions as a long term lending institution and its primary mission is to financially support
economically sound projects that are important for European integration and the future of the
European Union. The EIB is the main shareholder of the European Investment Fund (EIF),
possessing 62% of its capital. The EIB is taking a very active role in support of European
Commission policies, especially the current European Commission Investment Plan for Europe
(ECIPE), known informally as "Junker’s plan" and in that framework it crated the European
Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI).
The role of the EIB and of its satellite organizations (EIF, EFSI, etc..) in the funding of in-
novation in Europe is crucial and represents a large part of the bank’s activity even though it has
other important missions, outside the scope of this study, like financing infrastructure projects in
Europe (bridges, hospitals, etc...) and facilitating European integration and economic stability
in Europe. The role of the EIB in fostering innovation in Europe became even more important in
the context of the current global financial crisis. Indeed, the funding of innovation has suffered
a lot after the 2008 financial crisis, that started in the summer of 2007 as the Sub-prime crisis in
the United States. In the first semester of 2009, for example, there was almost no credit offered
by the banks, which brought the real economy and innovation in particular to a standstill. The
E.U member states intervened to prevent the banks going under by establishing programs similar
those of the American Federal Government (quantitative easing, etc..) that were deeply unpop-
ular because they were seen by the general public as a gift made to the banks while in reality
it wasn’t: those were loans offered to the banks from the states and the banks did pay them
back in full in the years that followed, which even generated a profit for the states. In fact, since
those loans were a lot more expensive than inter-bank lending, had it been available at the time,
banks were in a hurry to reimburse the states and move on. Even though those rescue packages
for the bank were successful in preventing a total banking and financial collapse, the availability
of credit has never fully recovered to this date in France and in Europe, and innovation suffers
a lot because of this.
In this context of a credit crunch, it is the SME’s that suffer the most because they are
the ones that would be quickly asphyxiated in the absence of funding. One of the principal
missions of the EIB is to help those SME’s find funding; not by directly giving them loans as
it doesn’t have the infrastructure and many local branches needed to interact with individual
clients directly, but by providing traditional commercial banks incentives to lend to those SME’s,
especially innovating SME’s. The EIB can provide credit to banks on the condition that they
use those guarantees exclusively to lend to SME’s. Those SME’s need of course to have a sound
business project and they have to be able to reimburse their loan since the EIB, while it’s a
not for profit organization, isn’t an institution that hands out economic and financial aid either.
Those EIB guaranties make lending to innovating SME’s and start-up’s an activity that is more
attractive, less risky and more profitable for banks. The guaranties induce several beneficial
effects for banks and they also generates leverage, which is typically quite high and in the order
of a factor of 8 to 15, but remains safe because it is powered not by mere speculation but by the
status of the EIB as a trustworthy European Institution, on the same level of standing and trust
as the European Central Bank (ECB).
Specifically, the advantages that banks get from EIB guaranties in exchange from offering
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loans to SME’s, especially innovating ones, can be listed as follows :
• A rate advantage: because lending to young unproven companies, especially those that
are producing innovating products, which may on may not succeed commercially, is more
risky for a bank, it may refuse to do so in general, therefore young innovating companies do
not get the credit they desperately need to grow and succeed. The EIB guarantee (usually
40% to 50% of the value of the loan) allows the bank to be compensated for the risk it is
taking and to finance that risk. Because of that guarantee of the EIB, the bank can lower
its lending rate or take more risk at a given rate, which is currently still quite low and fixed
by the ECB.
• An equity advantage: offering credit to sub-prime agents has become considerably more
expensive for banks since Basel III regulations started to come into effect, accompanied by
a great increase in the complexity of the rules and regulations for the banking sector, which
are becoming more and numerous every year. There have been for example 47 separate new
rules in France in 2009 for the banking sector alone. Because those prudential regulations
force banks to have ever increasing levels of equity to back up their loans, which is crippling
and expensive, banks will greatly prefer to lend to SME’s that have a low risk of failing (a
baker’s shop for example) rather than to the innovating ones, created by an entrepreneur
who believes he or she has a revolutionary product based on new research. Even if the
entrepreneur who believes he or she has a revolutionary product could in theory be the
founder of the new Google or Facebook, banks just cannot take the risk of lending money
to that person : in the current regulatory atmosphere it just wouldn’t make business sense
to them. The guarantee from the EIB allows banks to lower their risk to the level where it
makes good business sense to them to use their precious equity, demanded by the regulator,
to back up a loan to an innovating company, thus fostering research and innovation in the
economy.
• A balance of payment advantage: this is directly linked to the regulatory requirement
for the banks of having equity to back up the loans. Indeed the loans that are guaranteed
by the EIB and which are, in the bank’s view, potentially toxic because they are offered
to small unproven, often innovating companies, can through legal mechanisms be, at least
partially, removed from the bank’s balance of payment, thus eliminating the need for the
bank to commit more equity and own funds to back them up. In the context of the current
financial crisis, large banks usually do not have liquidity problems, it is the regulatory high
level of equity needed to back up loans which is the limiting factor to providing credit
to the real economy and especially to the innovating agents of that economy. Therefore
the banks need the guaranties offered by the EIB much more than they would need extra
liquidity, provided by the EIB or the European Central Bank (BCE).
The EIB can also help fostering innovation in Europe through its participation in the EIF.
Unlike the EIB which specializes in very large, multi-billion euros operations with commercial
banks and doesn’t deal with the SME’s in a direct fashion, the EIF has a more local approach
and specializes in smaller operations focused on individual business projects which go though a
rigorous vetting process. In most cases, the EIF will act as a fund of funds: taking a participation
in specialized risk capital funds that in turn provide financing for very innovating, cutting edge
start up companies. In that respect, the EIF is acting a lot like a business angel or venture cap-
italist, except that its primary motivation as a European Institution is to make those companies
succeed for the greater good of the economy, rather than short or medium term profit and in
that regard, the EIF also forfeits most of the rights that a traditional investor would demand,
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like the right to have a say in the business decisions and general strategy of the companies it
invests into. The specialized funds that the EIF is working with have the know-how and the
experience to properly evaluate the chances of success and the soundness of the business plan of
those start-up companies in their field of expertise. It is a very hands-on, very local business to
vet those projects which may be very cutting edge and based on a newly filled patent. These spe-
cialized risk capital funds (around 45 of them in France and 460 in the European Union) provide
much needed capital investment to innovating start-ups (maybe the next Google), which are too
small to have access to the stock market and which are also too risky to have access to bank loans.
Finally, the EIB finances innovation in Europe in the framework of the Junker’s Plan through
the EFSI, which is designed to work in concert with European Commission economic policies.
For example the EIB has intensified its action, especially toward SME’s and innovating SME’s
in the framework of the Junker Plan. As a matter of fact, in 2008 it issued 57 billion euros of
guaranteed loans to banks among which 30% were earmarked for the SME’s and in 2014 that
commitment had increased to 77 billion euros of guaranteed loans to banks, again, 30% of which
were earmarked for the SME’s. The EIB and EIF also launched together the InnovFin initiative
in the framework of the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 program, which is an E.U wide
research and innovation program with nearly €80 billion in funding between 2014 and 2020, as
we have already seen. InnovFin consists of financing tools as well as advisory services designed
to boost research and innovation by attracting investors and thus help all companies, from the
start-up to the multinational, that wish to participate in the program, to be more innovating.
The EIB also helps supervise and finance many Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects, which
are an important vector of innovation in the European economy.
4 Conclusion
As a conclusion, we can say first of all that, when it comes to research and innovation that
foster sustainable economic growth and of the creation of jobs in the economy, both France and
the European Union have progressed a lot in recent years. While some worrisome flaws remain
in the French NSI, structural reforms in the framework of European integration, and often on
the American model, keep on improving the situation. While France may not be ranked by the
European Commission as one of the top innovating countries in Europe at the moment, as we
have seen, France does remain a key player with world-class research institutions and dynamic
entrepreneurs. To come back to the six modules that constitute an NSI, we could say that
France has excellent individual parts but that the interactions between those parts, sometimes,
still need to be perfect today. Regarding human resources, France still lags behind other
European countries when it comes to offering young people an education that will enable them
to be competitive in an innovating economy and to give them the opportunity to be innovators
themselves. Of course, the French higher education system produces world-class researchers and
engineers, in all fields of science, and the French business schools are ranked among the best in
the E.U and the world, but this excellence "at the top" is not enough. A healthy innovating econ-
omy also needs qualified technicians, accountants, marketing and communication people, etc..,
whose work is essential for research and innovation to be translated into successful companies,
from the start-up to the multinational, and economic growth. This is the kind of people that
the French education system, despite recent reforms in the good direction, seems incapable to
produce, despite high unemployment in the country.
Regarding public research, France with its many large and world-renowned public research
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administrations, like the CNRS, is at the cutting edge of science and technology in many fields,
but there is still, despite recent progress in the right direction, an insufficient mobility, both
of ideas and of people, between the world of public research and the world of private research,
business and innovation in the economy. Private research is in good shape as well, as an NSI
module of its own, and it benefits from a lot of help from the French State and the European
Union as well. However, the very favorable tax regimes and various financial structures designed
to foster research and innovation in France and in Europe cannot fully compensate for the very
heavy taxation and social security contributions that are burdening businesses, stunting invest-
ment and stifling innovation in the economy at the French and European level. Of course it is not
that simple but, taking a few shortcuts, we see very often a situation like this: scientific research
is conducted in France while corresponding economic innovation is taking place in countries with
lower taxes. Steps are taken, both at the French and European level to counter situations like
this, but more needs to be done. Moreover, as we have seen, the majority of private research
and innovation is still done by a handful of large companies, which are precisely those having
the means to fully exploit every French tax reduction program like the CIR, while at the same
time having the means to move production abroad where taxes are lower and/or labor legislation
laxer than in France. Innovating SME’s and start-up companies are having a more and more
important role in private research, supported by business and research clusters like Finance In-
novation or Cap Digital, French institutions like BPI France and European Institutions like the
EIB, but despite remarkable progress, especially given the current global financial crisis, a lot
still needs to be done to help innovating SME’s and start-up companies thrive.
When it comes to the relationship between industry and science, the French system
still retains to this day many characteristics of its traditional, and obsolete, "vertical" structure.
That traditional French system was based on research and scientific policy being decided at the
top political level and articulated around traditionally State controlled industries like national
defense, nuclear power, aeronautics and space, etc... Today, the relationship between industry
and science is becoming more "horizontal" in France, and research is becoming better adapted to
the needs of the economy, in every fields of economic activity, especially as industrial research and
development partnerships are created involving companies, large and small, from other countries
inside the European Union.
Innovating Entrepreneurs are many in France and their dynamism is world-renowned
and an important engine of economic growth. As we have seen, many highly efficient structures
and programs exist in France and at the European level that help the creation and continued
funding of start-up companies as well as small and medium enterprises. There are attractive tax
reductions systems for start-up creators, many private equity structures that also benefit from
tax advantages, the business and research clusters, which offer not only financial help but legal
and material help also, and the action of the European Investment Bank (EIB), which enables
commercial banks to offer loans to risky SME’s and start-up’s in a very difficult global financial
situation. Despite all this, a lot still needs to be done in France to facilitate the work of inno-
vating entrepreneurs and to render the French system as attractive as the American or British
system regarding the creation of start-up companies: in France, a lot of legal and administrative
roadblocks on the path of innovating entrepreneurs still remain, unfortunately.
Finally, general State policy, the last NSI module, is supposed to be cement that binds
together all the other parts into a coherent whole. Many countries have had a highly efficient
global State strategy for research and economic innovation for decades. This is the case in United
States, with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, which advises the President and helps
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define general federal policy regarding research and innovation. This is also the case in Germany
and the U.K. France used to lag far behind in that regard and for decades, general State policy
for research and innovation in France remained either essentially absent or tainted with short-
term political maneuvering that completely lacked vision and a long term sustainable plan to
boost research and innovation in the French economy. This situation has however been greatly
improving recently, especially with advent of the Programmes d’Investissement d’Avenir (PIA’s),
in concert with the process of European Integration. At the European level, France is naturally
part of the Europe 2020 program, started in 2010, that fixed precise objectives, for individual
member countries and the E.U as a whole, regarding research and innovation in the economy.
There is for example the goal of reaching a figure of 3% of the GDP for research and development
investments, while it stands at 2,5% in France today. There is also the goal of having at least
40% of new generations graduating from a higher leaning institution and obtaining a diploma.
This "union of the innovation" is under the supervision of the European Commission, which may
propose objectives and make yearly recommendations to the member States regarding research
and innovation. It is inside this European framework and through partnerships with other E.U
countries that the French general State policy has the best chances of finally becoming the cement
binding together all the remarkable assets that France possesses in its NSI. Indeed, it is as a part
of Europe, that France will eventually achieve its true potential as a world leader in scientific
research and economic innovation.
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